◆

    【外脑精华·北京】2009年7月28日我重点关注的是今年经济表现将会逊于美国和欧盟而且政局前景扑朔迷离的日本。定于8月底举行的全国大选很可能会让日本经济政策发生一些变化，而且可能会对美元走势产生影响。

　　在经过今年一季度迅猛下滑后，我预计日本经济降速将会放缓，但经济复苏之路将会漫长而曲折。重建库存进程进入尾声，而且持续攀升的大宗商品价格可能将会扼杀消费需求初显的复苏苗条。同时，政府公共支出将受到公共债务激增的掣肘。鉴于大规模去杠杆化活动正在抑制来自美国和欧洲的外需，日本出口导向型经济增长模式愈发显得难以为继。

　　因而，将日本“失落的十年”改称为“失落的数十年”可能更为恰如其分。上世纪90年代初以来急速放缓的日本经济最终在1998－1999年期间陷入衰退，此后又经历了偶有复苏的近10年的经济衰退期。作为贸易依存度最高的主要工业化国家，今年一季度日本GDP降幅位居全球主要工业国家之首，而且今年经济在全球三大经济体中表现最糟。尽管日本政府实施了大规模财政支出计划和扩张性货币政策，日本总体需求锐减，而且通缩卷土重来。我基于分析结果预期，日本经济衰退将持续至今年年底，然后在2010年开始逐渐复苏。

内需不振，通缩卷土重来

　　虽然日本经济降速较今年一季度时放缓，但重建库存拉动的产出和出口反弹充其量将只能让日本经济在低位企稳，不足以推动日本经济强劲复苏。日本经济的复苏将取决于来自日本商品主要消费地区美国和欧洲的外部需求。中国需求曾经助推了2005－2007年期间日本经济的增长，但这次中国需求恐怕将会爱莫能助。中国是日本最大的出口目的地，但中国需求规模同美国和欧洲需求规模相去甚远。日本出口至中国的大部分商品属于中国生产出口至美国和欧洲的商品所需的生产资料，而不是中国零售商店所需的产成品或基础设施建设所需的原材料。

　　与此同时，企业和家庭部门收入前景暗淡造成日本内需不振。产能过剩抑制了日本资本支出的增长，因为企业认识到在供过于求以及产能利用率低下的背景下，没有必要扩充或提高产能。此外，营收持续下降以及和信贷紧缩削弱了企业购置新设备和兴建新厂房的能力。尽管日本政府采取了救济措施，但失业率持续攀升和家庭财富缩水造成日本家庭消费支出一直萎靡不振。更糟糕的是，日本工资水平降速超过了生活成本的降速。

　　在1999－2005年期间一直受困于物价持续下跌的日本再度陷入通缩泥潭，而且鉴于需求低迷以及工资水平持续下降，本次通缩可能会持续更长时间。鉴于油价回落产生了基数效应，预计日本消费者物价指数将于今年三季度跌至低点。不过，鉴于需求和工资水平持续下降，日本核心通胀率在秋季后可能仍难脱离负值区间。我预计，2009、2010年，日本消费物价指数在将一直徘徊在负值区间。同2006－2008年期间日本消费者物价指数出现小幅上涨的情况一样，当前阶段的所有通胀压力将主要来自成本推动因素－－上涨的能源和原材料价格，而并非内需。

　　日本政府于2009年4月份宣布将启动规模高达15.4万亿日元的财政刺激计划后，日本公共财政的持续性已经遭受质疑。这项日本有史以来最大规模的经济刺激计划将令日本国债同GDP之比在2010年时飙升至近200%。高企的债务率令日本在今年5月丧失了AAA级国家信用评级。由于不愿看到日本经济因税率上调、社会支出下滑以及公共投资下降陷入长期滞胀深渊，日本政策决策者们已经启动了至少贯穿至2015年的财政改革。与此同时，政策决策者们可能会哄骗日本央行继续发行国债。日本当地居民持有多数日本国债，但储蓄率下降以及日本居民购买国债意愿减弱可能将令日本政府国债发售遭受重创。

政权更迭，可能引发美元暴跌

　　鉴于日本首相麻生太郎大失民心、其所领导的政府频频爆出丑闻以及经济决策失误，2009年政府大选可能会使得日本政策发生转变，从而终结半个多世纪以来自民党一统江山的历史。在7月中旬于东京举行的地方选举中，自民党惨败于日本民主党，丧失了参议院中的多数席位，这预示着在8月30日举行的下议院大选将会上演一场龙争虎斗。前自民党党员、现民主党领导人鸠山由纪夫极有可能出任日本下届政府首相。

　　虽然民主党官员们发表的不同论调表明民主党内部对政策立场存在分歧，但如果民主党获胜，可能会进一步放宽财政政策而且更倾向于利用货币干预手段。但是，民主党可能会带来一些令人欣慰的变化，例如通过鼓励生育和完善社保体系来根除日本消费者需求低迷和出生率下降的顽疾。民主党还希望减少内阁领导班子在决策过程中的官僚习气。大型制造企业中的一些成员，尤其是环保产品生产企业和廉价商品和服务供应商可能将从民主党推行的强化环保政策和救助低收入家庭举措中受益匪浅。

　　不幸的是，无论政策决策者采取何种举措，巨大的负产出缺口都将挫伤日本中期经济。因而赢得大选的政党将面临的一项严峻考验是人口迅速老龄化带来了劳动人口下降和消费市场萎缩等一系列长期负面效应。日本婴儿潮一代将于2010年年初达到65岁，政策决策者需要果断采取行动来避免当资金匮乏的养老保险系统需要向大量新退休人员支付养老金时，公共债务激增至失控水平。旨在提高居民拥有权的土地使用制度改革将会促使更多家庭和消费消费者通过抵押房产抽取资金来进行消费。

　　一些民主党议员已经誓言将会减持美国国债，这表明如果民主党成为执政党，公共养老基金和其他半官方基金机构（如近期开展私有化改革的国有控股企业日本邮政控股公司）可能将转向增持高收益率的资产。外汇储备多元化战略以及养老基金抛售美元资产可能引发美元大幅贬值。日本是美国国债第二大持有国（仅次于中国）。今年日本国际收支盈余的下降可能已经引发日本外汇储备增速放缓以及美国国债持有量下降。虽然美国经常帐赤字规模下降而且美国储蓄率上升，一旦日本停止购买美国国债和抛售美元资产或是透露这种意愿，美国将有迎来无法满足融资需求的一段艰难岁月。此举将可能引发美元出现无序下跌，并且丧失全球储备货币的霸主地位，尤其是如果其他外汇储备大国纷纷效仿日本的做法。

　　不过，由于持有大量美元资产而且政策决策者们希望通过日元贬值来救助日本出口产业，日本并不希望看到美元崩盘。因此，日本可能仍将实行渐进式的外汇储备多元化战略，但今年8月份可能出现的政权更迭徒增了这方面的不确定性。

英文原文：Can Japan Avoid Another Lost Decade?

    This week I focus on Japan, which will not only underperform the U.S. and E.U. economically in 2009, but also faces political uncertainty. National elections, scheduled for the end of August, are quite likely to bring some changes to Japanese economic policy and could also hold ramifications for the U.S. dollar.

    I expect the pace of the Japanese economic contraction to ease from the sharp decline of first-quarter 2009, but the road to recovery will be long and bumpy. Inventory restocking is coming to an end, and rising commodity prices could curtail a nascent recovery in consumer demand. Meanwhile, public spending is constrained by soaring public debt, and Japan's export-oriented model of growth seems increasingly unsustainable, given the degree to which deleveraging is stifling external demand from the U.S. and Europe.

    Japan's Lost Decade might thus be more aptly called its "Lost Decades." The sharp economic slowdown of the early 1990s culminated in a recession in 1998-99, only to be followed by another near decade of recessions and paltry growth. Being the most trade-dependent of major industrialized nations, Japan suffered the worst GDP contraction among these countries in first-quarter 2009, and is on track to perform the worst of the G-3 in 2009. Aggregate demand slid precipitously, and deflation took hold once again, despite massive fiscal spending and monetary expansion. My analysts and I project Japan's recession will persist through 2009, then give way to gradual recovery in 2010.

Feeble Aggregate Demand

    Though the pace of economic contraction has slowed since first-quarter 2009, the inventory-driven rebound in production and exports will at best make for stabilization at low levels, rather than a strong economic expansion. Japan's recovery will hinge on external demand from the U.S. and Europe--the main final consumers of Japanese goods. Chinese demand, which helped boost Japan in 2005-07, may be of little help this time. China is the top destination for Japanese exports, but Chinese demand is mostly a function of U.S. and European demand. Most Japanese exports to China are inputs for goods bound for the U.S. and Europe, not finished goods bound for Chinese retail stores or raw materials needed for infrastructure projects.

    Meanwhile, domestic demand in Japan has suffered from the poor earnings outlook for both firms and households. Japan's overcapacity has curbed capital expenditure growth as firms see no need to expand or upgrade capacity when supply exceeds demand and capacity utilization is low. Moreover, falling earnings and tight credit reduce the affordability of new equipment and factories. Rising unemployment and the destruction of household wealth have kept household consumption weak, despite government handouts. Worse yet, wages are decreasing faster than the cost of living.

Deflation ... Again

    Japan, which suffered from falling prices from 1999 to 2005, is back in deflation and may be facing a protracted period of price declines due to anemic demand growth and falling wages. Consumer inflation will see its nadir in third-quarter 2009, due to base effects from lower oil prices, but both headline and core inflation may remain negative even beyond the autumn, given falling demand and wages. I expect annual CPI inflation to be negative in 2009 and 2010. And like the meager inflation of 2006-08, any extant inflationary pressure will come predominantly from cost-push sources （rising energy and material costs） rather than domestic demand.

Public Debt: Unsustainable?

    The sustainability of Japan's public finances has come under scrutiny in the wake of the 15.4 trillion yen fiscal stimulus package announced in April 2009--the biggest in Japan's history--which will send public debt soaring to about 200% of GDP by 2010. Japan's heavy debt load led to the loss of its AAA sovereign rating in May 2009. Reluctant to burden a long-stagnant economy with higher taxes, social spending cuts and lower public investment, policymakers have put fiscal reform on hold until at least 2015. In the meantime, policymakers will probably cajole the Bank of Japan to continue monetizing the public debt. Locals hold most of Japan's public debt, but a declining savings rate coupled with declining home bias could wreak havoc on Japanese government bonds.

A New Ruling Party for Change?

    Due to Prime Minister Aso's severe unpopularity and his administration's scandals and economic failings, the 2009 general elections may bring a shift in Japan's policies, ending 50-plus years of de facto one-party rule under the Liberal Democratic Party （LDP）. The LDP lost its majority of seats to the Democratic Party of Japan （DPJ） in Tokyo local elections in mid-July, foreshadowing a struggle in the Aug. 30 general elections for the Lower House of Parliament. Former LDP member turned DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama has a strong chance of becoming Japan's next prime minister.

    A DPJ win could bring looser fiscal policy and a greater willingness to use currency intervention, though contradictory remarks from DPJ officials suggest a disunited stance. Nonetheless, the DPJ could bring welcome changes that address Japan's ailing consumer demand growth and falling birth rate, such as child support and an expanded social safety net. The DPJ also hopes to convert the policymaking process into less of a bureaucracy-led cabinet system. Unions at large manufacturers, especially those that produce eco-friendly products and low-priced goods and services, may stand to benefit from the DPJ's tougher environmental policies and support for low-income families.

    Unfortunately, a deeply negative output gap will dampen the economy in the medium term, no matter what policymakers do. A critical test for the winner will thus be attending to the longer-term ramifications of a rapidly aging population, such as a shrinking labor force and consumer market. With Japan's baby boomers reaching age 65 by the early 2010s, policymakers will need to act quickly to prevent public debt from spiraling out of control when the underfunded pension system meets an onslaught of retirees. Land use reforms that increased homeownership could encourage larger families and higher consumer spending against home equity.

U.S. Dollar Dump a Danger

    Some members of the DPJ have vowed to shun U.S. debt, which suggests public pension funds and other quasi-government funds （such as the newly privatized Japan Post Holdings, whose shares are still held by the government） could move to higher-yielding assets if DPJ becomes the ruling party. Diversification of foreign exchange reserves and pension funds away from the U.S. dollar could mean sharp losses for the dollar. Japan is the second-largest foreign holder of Treasurys （after China）. The reduction in Japan's external surplus in 2009 may already have contributed to a reduction in Japanese reserve growth and U.S. debt holdings. Despite the decrease in the U.S. current account deficit and a higher U.S. savings rate, the U.S. would have a very difficult time meeting its financing needs if Japan stopped buying U.S. debt and sold off its dollar assets or signaled the intent to do so. Such a move could precipitate a disorderly decline in the U.S. dollar and the loss of its supremacy as a global reserve currency, especially if other reserve holders followed Japan's lead.

    A dollar crash would be undesirable for Japan, though, due to its large U.S. dollar holdings and its policymakers' desire to aid Japanese exporters through a weak domestic currency. Japanese reserve diversification is thus likely to remain gradual, but the chance of political change come August 2009 raises uncertainty on this point.

    Nouriel Roubini, a professor at the Stern Business School at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, is a weekly columnist for Forbes.

责任编辑：木木