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    【外脑精华·北京】鉴于房价持续下跌和信贷环境日趋严峻对美国经济构成的沉重压力，有人担心，正如上世纪90年代初泡沫破裂后的日本一样，美国也将经历十年的经济停滞。

　　日本房地产泡沫的动力包括廉价资金和金融自由化，而且，当时的日本正如美国一样，大多数人都认为，房价不可能出现全国性的下跌。在房价的全国性下跌成为事实之后，借款人大范围违约，而银行则削减了贷款。最终的结果是年均经济增长率不到1％的十年。

日本泡沫经济并不比美国严重

　　大多数人认为，美国不可能遭受日本那样的命运，然而，人们夸大了两国间的一些差别。例如有人声称，日本的泡沫远大于美国的泡沫。但事实上，美国的全国平均住房价格在2000－2006年间上涨了90％，相比之下，日本住房价格在最高点之前的六年中（1985－1991年）的涨幅则只有51％。虽然日本大城市的房价上涨更为迅速，但要衡量对国民经济的影响，则全国性数字更为重要。顶点过后，日本的房价已经下跌了40％以上，而美国的房价则下跌了20％，许多经济学家认为，美国房价还会下跌10％甚至更多。

　　商业房地产方面，上述时段中，日本80%的平均价格涨幅也低于美国90％的涨幅。因此，就规模而言，日本的房地产泡沫要小于美国的泡沫。

　　当时的日本也有股市泡沫，早于房地产泡沫一年破裂。日本股市泡沫的破裂打击了银行业，因为银行普遍将其持有的部分其他企业股份计入资本；然而，居民部门受到的影响却是有限的，因为日本只有30％的人口持有股票，美国的持股人口份额则超过50％。

日本政府应对及时，但通缩时期犯下大错

　　另一方面，在泡沫破裂后，日本决策者降息以及放松财政政策的动作也决不比美国迟缓，公众对这一点存在误解。1991年7月，日本房价刚刚开始下跌，其央行即开始降息。到1993年底，贴现率已由6％降至1.75％。比较而言，在美国房价开始下跌两年之后，联邦基金利率由5.25％降至2％。美联储进行的一项研究发现，上世纪90年代初，日本利率下降的速度超出了“泰勒规则”所要求的水平。泰勒规则是指，在一定的产能闲置比率和通胀率之下的适当利率水平。

　　此外，日本还对其经济进行了大规模的财政刺激。以排除周期因素的预算赤字（即排除经济减速对税收的自动影响后的赤字）衡量，1992、1993年间，日本预算赤字的年均增量相当于GDP的1.8％，与今年美国预算刺激措施的规模相仿。

　　事实上，日本的货币和财政刺激措施的确有助于其经济增长。在1993－1994年的衰退过后，到1995年，日本的GDP年增长率已回升到2.5％左右。

　　然而，就在1995年，日本出现通货紧缩，实际利率和实际债务负担随之上升。日本最重大的政策错误都是在此后犯下的。1997年，日本政府提高了消费税，以图减少预算赤字。而且，央行在将利率降至零点附近之后，就认为自己已经竭尽所能了；相当一段时间之后，央行才开始大规模增加货币发行量。

美国具备多项有利条件，但日本的教训不容忽视

　　智囊机构美国企业研究所的John Makin认为，要重振日本经济，货币和财政刺激措施是必要的，但仅此是不够的。日本经济复兴缺少一个要素，即清理银行体系。要知道，日本企业比美国企业更加依赖银行。日本的银行一方面把不良贷款隐藏在不透明的公司结构之下，另一方面则削减对盈利丰厚的企业发放的新贷款。这样就造成了一种恶性循环――银行的不良贷款抑制了经济增长，进而导致了更多的不良贷款。

　　麦格理证券的Richard Jerram在一份报告中提出，美国不会重蹈日本的覆辙，因为美国的监管体系、金融市场和政治结构都不会允许本国如此长久地拖延变革。凭借更加透明的监管结构，即使监管机构自身未能及时发现银行向资产负债表外转移高风险的证券化资产，美国也能够迫使银行承认损失，并修复资产负债表。而日本监管机构却与该国银行沆瀣一气，帮助其隐藏不良贷款。

　　比较而言，过去一年中，美国银行在披露并注销损失、以及筹集新资本方面的动作要快于上世纪90年代的日本银行。

　　日本花费了很长时间，才具备了足够的政治意志，得以用纳税人的钱修复银行体系。就此而言，美国财政部也面临着考验：能否尽快认识到对举步维艰的抵押贷款巨头房利美和房地美实行国有化的必要性。

　　麦格理证券的Jerram表示，美国相对于日本的一项优势在于，住房市场滑坡的一部分成本是由其他国家承担的。美国抵押担保证券的很大一部分是由外国投资者持有的。而且，主权财富基金为美国银行提供了新资本。此外，在美元走低，当前美国旺盛的出口也有助于支撑其经济。当时日本的情况则恰恰相反――泡沫破灭之后，日元急剧升值，从而在内需低迷之际令出口遭受打击。

　　当前美国的另一项有利条件是通胀率超过5%。这种较高的通胀率不仅使实际利率处于负区间，而且有助于房价以较小的跌幅回归合理价位――如果没有较高的通胀率，美国的房价就需要更大的跌幅。

　　但另一方面，美国也面临着不利因素。1991年日本的泡沫破裂之时，其居民储蓄率为15％，到2001年则降至5％，其储蓄率的下降支撑了消费支出。相比之下，当前美国的储蓄率接近零，因此无法像日本那样为消费提供缓冲。

　　如果美国能够吸取日本的教训，就能够避免低迷的十年。反之，如果华盛顿认为日本的经济困境仅仅反映了该国的宏观经济弱点，就太过自以为是了。其他国家的经历表明，资产价格的大幅下跌往往会导致持续多年的经济下滑。只有疯狂的乐观者才会认为，美国经济最糟糕的时期已经过去了。

英文原文：Lessons from a “lost decade”

Will America follow Japan into a decade of stagnation?

    AS FALLING house prices and tightening credit squeeze America's economy, some worry that the country may suffer a decade of stagnation, as Japan did after its bubble burst in the early 1990s. Japan's property bubble was also fuelled by cheap money and financial liberalisation and－just as in America－most people assumed that property prices could not fall nationally. When they did, borrowers defaulted and banks cut their lending. The result was a decade with average growth of less than 1％.

    Most dismiss the idea that America could suffer the same fate as Japan, but some of the differences are overstated. For example, some claim that Japan's bubble was much bigger than America's. Yet average house prices nationwide rose by 90％ in America between 2000 and 2006, compared with a gain of 51％ in Japan between 1985 and early 1991, when Japanese home prices peaked （see left-hand chart）. Prices in Japan’s biggest cities rose faster, but nationwide figures matter more when gauging the impact on the economy. Japanese home prices have since fallen by just over 40％. American prices are already down by 20％, and many economists reckon they could fall by another 10％ or more.

    What about commercial property? Again, average prices rose by less in Japan （80％） than in America （90％） over those same periods. Thus Japan’s property boom was, if anything, smaller than America’s. Japan also had a stockmarket bubble, which burst a year earlier than that in property. This hurt banks, because they counted part of their equity holdings in other firms as capital. But its impact on households was modest, because only 30％ of the population held shares, compared with over half of Americans.

    Nor were Japanese policymakers any slower than American ones to cut interest rates and loosen fiscal policy after the bubble burst, contrary to popular misconceptions. The Bank of Japan （BoJ） began to lower interest rates in July 1991, soon after property prices began to decline. The discount rate was cut from 6％ to 1.75％ by the end of 1993. Two years after American house prices started to slide, the Fed funds rate has fallen from 5.25％ to 2％（see right-hand chart）. A study by America’s Federal Reserve concluded that Japanese interest rates fell more sharply in the early 1990s than required by the "Taylor rule", which establishes the appropriate rate using the amount of spare capacity and inflation.

    Japan also gave its economy a big fiscal boost. The cyclically adjusted budget deficit （which excludes the automatic impact of slower growth on tax revenues） increased by an annual average of 1.8％ of GDP in 1992 and 1993－similar to America’s budget boost this year. Japan's monetary and fiscal stimulus did help to lift the economy. After a recession in 1993-94, GDP was growing at an annual rate of around 2.5％ by 1995. But deflation also emerged that year, pushing up real interest rates and increasing the real burden of debt. It was from here on that Japan made its biggest policy mistakes. In 1997 the government raised its consumption tax to try to slim its budget deficit. And with interest rates close to zero, the BoJ insisted that there was nothing more it could do. Only much later did it start to print lots of money.

    America's inflation rate of above 5％ is an advantage. Not only are real interest rates negative, but inflation is also helping to bring the housing market back to fair value with a smaller fall in prices than otherwise. But in another way America is more exposed than Japan was. When its bubble burst in 1991, Japan's households saved 15％ of their income. By 2001 saving had fallen to 5％, which helped to prop up consumer spending. America's saving rate of close to zero leaves no such cushion.

The perils of procrastination

    John Makin, at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, argues that monetary and fiscal relief were necessary but not sufficient to revive Japan's economy. The missing ingredient was a clean-up of the banking system, on which Japanese firms were more dependent than their American counterparts. Japanese banks hid their bad loans beneath opaque corporate structures, and curtailed new lending to profitable businesses. A vicious circle developed, whereby banks' bad loans depressed growth which then created more bad loans.

    In another new report Richard Jerram, at Macquarie Securities, concludes that America "will not come close to repeating the experience of Japan", because its regulatory system, financial markets and political structure will not let it procrastinate for so long. America has a more transparent regulatory structure which presses banks into recognising losses and repairing their balance-sheets－even if regulators were slow to recognise that the banks were shifting risky securitised assets off their balance-sheets in the first place. But Japan's regulators for a long while were in cahoots with banks over hiding their bad loans.

    Over the past year, American banks have been quicker than those in Japan in the 1990s to disclose and write off losses and raise new capital. In Japan it took a long while before the political will was there to use taxpayers' money to plug the banking system. A big test for America's Treasury will be how quickly it recognises the need to nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the teetering mortgage giants.

    One advantage over Japan, says Mr Jerram, is that America is spreading the costs of its housing bust across other countries. Foreigners hold a large slice of American mortgage-backed securities. Sovereign-wealth funds have provided new capital for American banks. And America's booming exports have helped to support its economy, thanks to the cheap dollar. In contrast, the yen's sharp appreciation after Japan's bubble burst hurt exports at the same time as domestic demand was being squeezed.

    By learning from Japan's mistakes, America can avoid a dismal decade. However, it would be arrogant for those in Washington, DC, to assume that Japan's troubles simply reflected its macroeconomic incompetence. Experience in other countries shows that serious asset-price busts often lead to economic downturns lasting several years. Only a wild optimist would believe that the worst is over in America.

责任编辑：木木